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INTRODUCTION 
The People’s Republic of China (the “PRC” or “China”) 
carries the mantle of one of the world’s oldest civilizations: that of 
imperial China, a place notable not only for its duration but also 
for its inventiveness.1  While the West ultimately gained 
ascendancy as the primary locus of technological innovation,2 
imperial China bore witness to the so-called “four great 
inventions”—paper, gunpowder, typography, and the compass—
 
 1 See Charles L. Miller, A Cultural and Historical Perspective to Trademark Law 
Enforcement in China, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 117 (2004).  
 2 See, e.g., Andrew Nusca, Top 10 Innovative Countries; Denmark Leads World in 
2010; Sweden, U.S. to Follow, SMARTPLANET (January 13, 2011), 
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/smart-takes/top-10-innovative-countries-denmark-
leads-world-in-2010-sweden-us-follow/13487 (deeming the world’s ten most innovate 
countries to be Denmark, Sweden, the United States, Finland, Britain, Norway, Ireland, 
Singapore, Iceland, and Canada).  
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before the emergence of their occidental counterparts.3  Imperial 
China is also justly famed for its developments in chemistry, 
physics, ship design, metallurgy, and ceramics.4  Such 
achievements rendered imperial China a far more technologically 
advanced place than either medieval or Renaissance Europe.5  This 
preeminent status began to wane only during the Qing Dynasty, the 
last in the string of hereditary absolutist monarchies that together 
constituted imperial China.6 
Accordingly, one might expect that contemporary China 
accords the products of creative enterprise due intellectual property 
(“IP”) protections in the same vein as the West, so as to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”7  While China does 
possess a sophisticated intellectual property regime, it is an open 
question whether that regime serves sufficiently to protect the 
interests of foreign holders of intellectual property rights (“IPR”) 
who seek to enforce those rights in China.8 
As remarkable as is imperial China’s durability, the PRC is 
equally remarkable for the rapidity with which it has become the 
world’s second largest economy, trailing only the United States.9  
The steady economic growth that China enjoyed over the course of 
the 1980s became “torrid” in the 2000s, when trade and foreign 
direct investment began to supplement the domestic demand that 
 
 3 Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant 
Offense?, 32 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 7–8 (2006) (“It is common knowledge that 
the Chinese invented a number of items prior to their ‘invention’ or use in the West.  The 
famous four great inventions—papermaking, typography, the compass, and gunpowder—
have profoundly impacted the world’s economy and human culture.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
 4 Miller, supra note 1, at 117. 
 5 Id. (noting that “China’s technological achievements kept it far in advance of 
medieval and early Renaissance Europe”).  
 6 Id. at 118–19. 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
 8 See MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, i (2009) (“China has the highest levels of copyright piracy 
and trademark counterfeiting in the world, even though it also provides the highest per 
capita volume of enforcement.”). 
 9 See List of Countries by Gross Domestic Product, CIA World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited 
November 18, 2012).   
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had been fueling economic growth until then.10  Previously, 
China’s economic reforms and their attendant influence on the 
growth of its economy were perceived as relatively insignificant by 
the rest of the world.11  By 2010, however, China had become the 
world’s largest exporter.12  Moreover, between 2003 and 2011, 
China’s overall trade surplus grew from roughly $25 billion to over 
$150 billion, while its trade surplus with the United States grew 
during the same period from just over $50 billion to roughly $200 
billion.13 
Two important trends mark this breathtaking economic ascent.  
First, foreign direct investment increased substantially during this 
brief period as foreigners either invested in existing Chinese 
enterprises or embarked on undertakings of their own.14  In 2006, 
for example, foreigners invested $193 billion in 27,514 projects in 
China.15  Second, this period also bore witness to the increasing 
sophistication of Chinese exports, which shifted in kind from 
apparel, textiles, footwear, and toys to electronics, 
telecommunications equipment, office machines, and appliances.16  
China, therefore, is a far cry from the “hermit . . . creeping out of 
its shell” that it was dubbed as recently as one generation ago.17  
Instead, China and the rest of the world are inextricably 
intertwined, a reality that especially affects foreign holders of 
intellectual property rights who do business in China. 
This Note seeks to resolve a paradox that currently exists in the 
field of Chinese intellectual property law.  On the one hand, the 
Chinese enforcement regime—and its shortcomings in the eyes of 
 
 10 EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T 
THREATEN THE WEST 71 (2010).  
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Aaron Back, China’s Trade Surplus Shrank in ‘11, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204124204577151632896924706.html.  
While China’s overall trade surplus shrank in 2011, its surplus with the United States 
grew; Back attributes such growth to the United States benefiting “less than some 
countries from China’s appetite for raw materials.” Id.  
 14 STEINFELD, supra note 10, at 72.  
 15 Id.  
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 71.  
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foreigners—is a topic that garners substantial attention at the 
uppermost levels of the United States government and private 
sector.  On the other hand, relatively few foreigners actually make 
use of China’s system, and some commentators decry what they 
allege to be a mischaracterization of China’s intellectual property 
regime as flawed, recommending instead that foreign right holders 
make greater use of China’s enforcement mechanisms.  Are 
China’s apologists justified in portraying its intellectual property 
institutions in a positive light?  Or, are foreign critics accurate in 
disparaging China’s intellectual property regime? 
Part I analyzes the causes for these apparently incompatible 
perspectives by tracing the development of intellectual property 
protections in China from their earliest appearance.  In particular, 
Part I moves from a general historical overview of intellectual 
property in China to a survey of the current legal and bureaucratic 
institutions that constitute its intellectual property regime.  In 
addition, Part I submits empirical data that attest to the notably 
small proportion of intellectual property civil lawsuits in China 
involving foreign parties. 
Part II presents the conflict that this Note seeks to resolve.  In 
particular, Part II lays out the views of those apologists who hold 
that China’s legal institutions are equipped to provide just 
resolutions of intellectual property disputes.  Part II also presents 
the perspective of critics in the United States government and 
private sector, both of which generally perceive the Chinese 
intellectual property regime in a negative light. 
Part III concludes that the problems plaguing China’s 
intellectual property regime render the apologist perspective 
misleading.  Specifically, Part III acknowledges the commendable 
aspects of that regime, but contends that it would be misguided for 
foreign right holders who attempt to vindicate their rights in China 
to expect enforcement to proceed efficiently and reliably.  In 
addition, Part III links historical phenomena present during the 
imperial period of Chinese history to the current approach that 
Chinese officials have taken in administering China’s intellectual 
property regime.  Finally, Part III concludes with recommendations 
for steps that foreign victims of infringement can take so as to 
improve their ability to enforce their rights in China. 
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I. LOOKING BACKWARD TO UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT: A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA AND 
THE STATE OF THE CURRENT REGIME 
A. The History of Intellectual Property Law in China 
1. Cultural Underpinnings: Local Custom, Confucianism, and 
Buddhism 
The received wisdom among both Chinese and Western 
scholars is that intellectual property—specifically, copyright—first 
emerged shortly after the development of printing.18  Scholarly 
works on copyright have traditionally regarded Gutenberg’s 
invention of the printing press as the impetus for copyright 
protections in the West.19  Similarly, Chinese historians link the 
emergence of copyright protections in China to the rise of printing 
there during the Tang Dynasty.20  Nevertheless, as Harvard 
University professor William P. Alford contends in his seminal 
work on the history of Chinese intellectual property law, “neither a 
formal nor an informal counterpart to copyright or other major 
forms of intellectual property law” existed in imperial China.21  
Indeed, some hold that no concept of intellectual property ever 
developed organically in China, pointing out that one could be 
touted as a great historian during the imperial era for producing a 
work consisting of little more than verbatim quotations of other 
works.22  Furthermore, the very word for “right” in the sense of a 
legal right, “quanli,” only entered the Chinese lexicon in the 
 
 18 See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 9 (1995).  
 19 See ZHENG CHENGSI & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA 11 (1991).  
 20 ALFORD, supra note 18, at 9.  According to Professor Alford, the view that the 
advent of printing led to the emergence of copyright protection is rooted in the notion that 
“innovation spurs the need for well-defined private property rights, which in turn provide 
the incentive needed to foster further innovation.” Id. at 133 n.2.  
 21 Id.   
 22 Charles R. Stone, What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary Observations on 
Classical Chinese Attitudes Toward What the West Calls Intellectual Property, 92 MARQ. 
L. REV. 199, 200 (2008) (citing Robert André LaFleur, Literary Borrowing and 
Historical Compilation in Medieval China, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 141, 141–44 (Lisa Buranen & Alice 
M. Roy eds., 1999)).  
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nineteenth century after being coined by an Englishman.23  While 
the view that intellectual property never truly existed in imperial 
China risks obscuring a complex historical landscape,24 China’s 
current intellectual property regime nevertheless came about in a 
cultural and legal context markedly different from that which 
enabled complementary institutions to emerge in the West. 
The nature of the law in imperial China differed in two 
fundamental respects from that of the Western legal tradition.  
First, positive law, in contrast to its role in the West, was not the 
“defining focus of social order” in imperial China.25  Second, the 
Chinese did not conceive of the law as cleaved into civil and 
criminal categories.26  Instead, the central government of imperial 
China, then an “agrarian state self-consciously organized along the 
model of an extended family,” relied on family and guild leaders 
and the heads of villages to enforce local customs.27  Accordingly, 
matters that would have been resolved under the civil law in the 
West were instead handled by these local authority figures, while 
the positive law that did exist assumed a secondary status to 
custom.28  Local authority figures were also responsible for tax 
collection and similar obligations, while representatives of the 
central government occasionally “went so far as to require the 
certification of guild chiefs” and to review the rules that they 
drafted.29  Overall, this system amounted to a “controlled 
delegation of authority” by the state to local actors.30  Such 
delegation, according to Professor Alford, afforded the central 
 
 23 William O. Hennessy, Protection of Intellectual Property in China (30 Years and 
More): A Personal Reflection, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1257, 1269 (2009). 
 24 See, e.g., Shi, supra note 3, at 46 (arguing that “China’s IPR enforcement 
insufficiency is not a traditional cultural phenomenon reflected by Confucian ethics” but 
that, instead, “Confucian ethics act as a unique moral foundation for intellectual property 
protection”).  
 25 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 10. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 10–11. 
 28 Id. at 10.  The positive law that did exist was essentially penal in nature and mainly 
addressed “the interactions of the state and individuals[.]” June Cohan Lazar, Protecting 
Ideas and Ideals: Copyright Law in the People’s Republic of China, 27 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 1185, 1203 (1996). 
 29 Id. at 12.  
 30 Id. at 11.  
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government the ability to regulate affairs at all levels of society by 
enabling it to overcome the hindrances that plagued imperial China 
for centuries, including disparate “dialects and customs, poor 
communications infrastructure, and persistent budgetary 
problems.”31 
While it would be misleading to claim that its Confucian 
heritage endowed China with a total “lack of consciousness of 
intellectual property,”32 Confucianism nevertheless profoundly 
shaped imperial Chinese society, especially in the realms of 
education and literature.  As a consequence, such concepts as 
plagiarism and copyright developed differently there than they did 
in the West.33  Confucianism itself defies easy categorization.  It is, 
in essence, a “systematic code of interpersonal behavior” more 
akin to a “practical, political, and social doctrine” than to a 
“religion or quasi-religion.”34  The system of education in imperial 
China was a thoroughly Confucian one.  Confucianism itself 
became the official subject of study for those seeking careers in the 
imperial governmental bureaucracy sometime between 140 and 87 
BCE,35 and from roughly 1300 CE to the dawn of the twentieth 
century, young scholars preparing for the imperial civil service 
examination—the mechanism by which this bureaucracy was 
staffed—were expected to commit the entire Confucian canon to 
memory.36  At its core, this path of study consisted exclusively in 
rote memorization37: after mastering an initial 2,000 Chinese 
characters, students embarked upon a roughly six-year-long 
process of memorizing a body of texts containing between 500,000 
 
 31 Id.  As Alford relates, this loose delegation of authority enhanced the reach of the 
central government where, by the late Qing period, “no more than a single representative 
of the emperor . . . [existed] for every 200,000 subjects.” Id.  
 32 Shi, supra note 3, at 3.  See also Stone, supra note 22, at 204 (“[I]t is safe to say that 
China’s traditions and its attitude toward the written word are inextricably linked to an 
educational system that was profoundly influenced by the teachings of its most famous 
philosopher and first professional teacher, Confucius (551–476 B.C.).”).  
 33 See Stone, supra note 22, at 200. 
 34 Shi, supra note 3, at 5. 
 35 See Marc H. Greenberg, The Sly Rabbit and the Three C’s: China, Copyright, and 
Calligraphy, 7 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 163, 173 (2010). 
 36 Hennessy, supra note 23, at 1262. 
 37 Stone, supra note 22, at 205. 
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and 600,000 characters38 with the aim of scoring well enough on 
the imperial civil service examination to secure a position within 
the ranks of the governmental bureaucracy.39  Confucianism and 
education thereby became closely intertwined—indeed, 
inseparable–in imperial China.  Moreover, because every scholar-
official had had the same Confucian education,40 “elite Chinese 
literature does not identify the sources of its quotations, even if 
they are rare.”41  Rather, the reader of such literature would have 
been presumed to be able to discern the source of the recycled 
material.42  In contrast, a reader incapable of recognizing the 
source of a particular passage would have been presumed to be 
unable to understand the text at hand.43  As a consequence of 
Confucianism’s influence on education and literature, verbatim 
copying was not considered to be an infringement of the rights of 
the original author.44 
As Bangor University professor Wei Shi contends, however, it 
would be erroneous to conclude that Confucianism alone gave rise 
to a culture of plagiarism that persists to this day in the form of 
China’s lackluster enforcement of intellectual property rights.45  
Indeed, Confucianism has influenced nations such as South Korea 
and Japan to at least the same extent as China, yet both of those 
nations suffer from lower rates of intellectual property 
infringement than China.46  Rather, Confucianism’s most enduring 
legacy in China appears to lie in its influence on the nature of 
interpersonal relations.47  In contrast to the West, a Confucian 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Benjamin A. Elman, Civil Service Examinations, in BERKSHIRE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CHINA 405–10 (2009); see also ALFORD, supra note 18, at 21–22. 
 40 Stone, supra note 22, at 210. 
 41 Id. at 209. 
 42 See id. at 203. 
 43 See id. at 210. 
 44 Id. at 200. 
 45 Shi, supra note 3, at 4. 
 46 Id. at 44. Shi notes, however, that fundamental differences exist between China on 
the one hand and Japan and South Korea on the other, including “China’s unique socialist 
ideology, administrative decentralization, inadequate judiciary and huge but inefficient 
bureaucracy[,]” all of which “have made intellectual property enforcement [in China] 
rather difficult.” Id. at 45. 
 47 See id. at 24–26. 
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society is comprised not of individual people but of relationships 
between people, that is, of their “interconnections and 
interdependencies.”48  Ultimately, Confucianism aims to bring 
about a harmonious society by modeling human affairs on the 
“proper order . . . [governing] all things in the universe.”49  
Accordingly, such a society esteems communal over private 
property, and perceives the individual as important only insofar as 
he contributes to society as a whole.50  For instance, the 
Confucian-influenced imperial Chinese weltanschauung regarded 
major technological advancements such as the development of 
medicine as “social enterprise[s] rather than as a succession of 
breakthroughs by individual geniuses.”51  Professor Shi posits that 
this Confucian social framework—in contrast to mainstream 
opinion52—fostered innovation in China, presumably by 
acknowledging and encouraging individual contributions to 
society.53  Accordingly, Professor Shi concludes that there is no 
connection between Confucianism and the rampant counterfeiting 
and piracy that has rendered intellectual property enforcement so 
difficult in contemporary China.54  Whether or not this assessment 
is correct, Confucianism doubtless imbued imperial China with a 
conception of the individual and society in stark contrast to the 
belief in the primacy of individual rights that ultimately gained 
ascendancy in the West.55 
 
 48 Id. at 8 citing Hyung Kim, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE 
WEST: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 30–31 (1981). 
 49 Id. at 6. 
 50 Id. at 9 (quoting John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes 
toward Property Rights Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 744 
(1999)). 
 51 Hennessy, supra note 23, at 1269 (citing Nathan Slivin, Introduction to 6 JOSEPH 
NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA, pt. VI, at 1, 1 (Nathan Silvin ed. 2000)). 
 52 See Shi, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“Under the dominating theory of this point of view 
[that traditional Chinese culture does not perceive copyright infringement to be wrong], 
Confucianism is a cultural predisposition leading to a lack of consciousness of 
intellectual property . . . likely to have a continuing influence on attitudes to[ward] IP 
protection.”). 
 53 See id. at 9.  
 54 See id.  
 55 See id. at 24 (noting that “[p]rivate property rights are among the fundamental 
concepts upon which many Western states are built and intellectual property rights were 
born of a predominantly Western concept of private property rights and benefits”). 
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The Confucian philosophical framework that underpinned 
imperial Chinese society provided for a rigidly hierarchical 
ordering of interpersonal relationships that necessarily 
encompassed the professional classes.  Officially, four such classes 
inhabited imperial China: scholar-officials, farmers, artisans, and 
merchants, in descending order of status.56  Naturally, those who 
had succeeded in assimilating the vast Confucian corpus and in 
attaining a position within the ranks of officialdom occupied the 
uppermost stratum, while those whose livelihood was the 
commercial activity so disdained by Confucianism57 inhabited 
society’s lowest rung. 
Both the scholarly class as well as members of the lowlier 
artisan and merchant classes engaged in creative activity that 
would have endowed them with modern intellectual property 
rights.  In particular, merchants guarded trade secrets pertaining to 
papermaking and silk weaving, while the elite Confucian literati 
propagated “the conduits of cultural continuity”: poetry, 
calligraphy, representational painting, and official dynastic 
histories.58  Spanning the lower three rungs of society, artisans 
produced ceramics and music, wrote songs, composed dramas, 
engaged in storytelling, and mastered architecture.59  Of course, 
formal intellectual property protections for such creative material 
did not yet exist in China.  Rather, this Confucian-based ordering 
of the professional classes is notable for its inherent hostility to the 
creation of such protections.  Confucianism’s rigid, vertical 
allocation of authority bore upon every member of traditional 
Chinese society.  By the sixteenth century, “[i]t was all ‘top 
down’” in imperial China, with ultimate power vesting in the 
Emperor.60  Such an environment, where the literati transmit rather 
than create and all of society defers to the established order, hardly 
 
 56 See Hennessy, supra note 23, at 1271. 
 57 See Lazar, supra note 28, at 1201 (asserting that Confucianism holds that 
“individuals should sacrifice personal profits in order to benefit the group”). 
 58 Hennessy, supra note 23, at 1271–72. 
 59 Id. at 1272. 
 60 Id. at 1275. 
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amounts to fertile ground for the codification of individual rights in 
the exclusive use of one’s original creations.61 
In addition to its influence on education, literature, and society, 
Confucianism also left its mark on the law.  The traditional 
Confucian view that positive law should be relegated to a status 
secondary to that of custom has not entirely disappeared;62 even 
today, many Chinese feel that the law should be employed “only as 
a last resort.”63  Instead, Confucianism asserts that morality and 
ritual should guide human conduct.64  As a corollary of its 
emphasis on instilling morality in its subjects,65 Confucianism 
holds that “a formal legal system serves only to make people 
litigious and self-interested.”66  Indeed, in a truly Confucian 
society, litigation is unnecessary.67  In its place, morality and ritual 
as promulgated by the central government and assimilated by the 
populace serves as the foundation of social order.68  The members 
of a Confucian society “learn to adjust their views and demands to 
accommodate other people’s needs and desires, to avoid 
confrontation and conflict, and to preserve harmony.”69  At bottom, 
individual desires must cede to group harmony.70  Regardless of 
whether specific aspects of China’s current intellectual property 
regime can be accounted for with reference to Confucianism, the 
school of thought influenced nearly every facet of imperial 
Chinese society, and for that reason alone merits discussion in any 
survey of Chinese legal history. 
 
 61 Id. at 1275–76. 
 62 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 10. 
 63 Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property 
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 971 (2006). 
 64 Greenberg, supra note 35, at 173. 
 65 Id. at 174.  
 66 Lazar, supra note 28, at 1201. 
 67 See Yu, supra note 63, at 970. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Lazar, supra note 28, at 1201. 
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In addition to Confucianism, and often neglected by scholarly 
treatments of Chinese intellectual property law,71 Buddhism 
exerted an equally powerful influence on imperial China’s literary 
development and, consequently, on its conception of intellectual 
property.  Buddhism was “inseparable from the earliest book 
copying, production, and printing in China.”72  By the seventh 
century CE, the publication and reproduction of sacred Buddhist 
texts outpaced that of Confucian literary works by a multiple in the 
thousands,73 and by the time commercial printing had emerged in 
China during the tenth century, “nearly half a million copies of 
Buddhist books and pictures are known to have been printed in the 
eastern part of China in one small area alone over a period of less 
than half a century.”74  Significantly, Buddhism emphasizes that in 
copying and circulating its sacred texts, one can receive the 
blessings of the Buddha himself.75  Other tenets of Buddhism 
include the religion’s encouragement of the renunciation of earthly 
possessions and its teaching that the material world itself is merely 
“a dream from which we must awaken sooner or later.”76  These 
aspects of Buddhism are obviously antagonistic to property rights, 
as they exist in the West.77  Moreover, Buddhist ideas would have 
gained currency in imperial China through the wide dissemination 
of Buddhist texts over the course of many centuries.  Perhaps 
because of Buddhism’s close connection to the emergence of the 
printed word in China, centuries separated the initial dissemination 
of Buddhist texts and the first claims by authors of an enforceable 
right to their printed works.78  Such a centuries-long gap is all the 
 
 71 See Stone, supra note 22, at 225 (noting that “law review articles about intellectual 
property in China usually discuss Confucianism as if it were the only school of thought 
that existed in imperial China”).  
 72 Id. at 228. 
 73 Id. at 227. 
 74 Id. at 228 (quoting Tsien Tsuen-Hsuin, Paper and Printing, in 5 SCIENCE AND 
CIVILISATION IN CHINA 1, 378 (Joseph Needham ed., 1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 75 See id.  
 76 Id. at 228–29 (quoting John Kieschnick, THE IMPACT OF BUDDHISM ON CHINESE 
MATERIAL CULTURE 2–3 (2003) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. at 230. 
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less surprising when Buddhism and Confucianism are considered 
together in their influence on Chinese literary development. 
2. Fits and Starts: The Nascence of Chinese Intellectual 
Property Protections and the Emergence of a Coherent 
Regime 
In the West, the concept of intellectual property developed as a 
means of enabling authors and inventors to prevent the state from 
expropriating their original works.79  Underpinning this concept is 
the belief that society benefits from providing formal incentives for 
original works, which disseminate among the greater population 
upon their creation.80  No analogous concept ever took root in 
imperial China.  Rather, the desire to maintain imperial power 
motivated “all known examples of efforts by the [imperial 
Chinese] state to provide protection for what we now term 
intellectual property,” a desire ultimately bound up with Confucian 
notions of maintaining an ordered, harmonious society.81  
Professor Alford characterizes the Confucian political culture of 
imperial China as the primary reason for the failure of the 
emergence there of a Western-style intellectual property regime82: 
because Confucianism conceived of Chinese society as an 
extended family with the ruler as its head, the ruler had the 
obligation as the population’s fiduciary to determine “which 
knowledge warranted dissemination and which ought to be 
circumscribed in the best interests of the commonwealth.”83 
Certain isolated initiatives resembling intellectual property 
protections, however, did emerge during the imperial era.  Such 
efforts included an edict promulgated in 835 CE banning the 
unauthorized reproduction of certain materials used for 
prognostication,84 the issuance in 1009 CE of an order mandating 
 
 79 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 18.  
 80 See id. 
 81 Id. at 17; see also Lazar, supra note 28, at 1201 (noting that “[t]he traditional 
Chinese legal system was shaped by the concept of social order propounded in Confucian 
philosophy”).  
 82 Id. at 19. 
 83 Id. at 23.  
 84 Id. at 13.  
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the prepublication review of printed works so as to prevent the 
unauthorized reproduction of other works,85 restrictions on the use 
of symbols associated with the ruling dynasty and officialdom,86 
and attempts to maintain the secrecy of medicinal production 
processes.87  Professor Alford contends, however, that all such 
examples of proto-intellectual property protections were born of 
the very same force responsible for the lack of a viable intellectual 
property regime in imperial China: the Confucian governmental 
framework dedicated to controlling the dissemination of ideas so 
as to uphold social harmony “by maintaining commercial order 
and reducing instances of deception of the populace.”88 
Similar motivations held sway in the West prior to the 
Industrial Revolution, however, including the disincentivizing of 
the publication of heterodox materials and the state’s desire to 
enhance its power, each of which served as the impetus for early 
copyright and patent protections, respectively.89  Nevertheless, it 
was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the focus 
of intellectual property shifted in the West from the state to the 
individual,90 a shift entirely in accord with the intellectual 
transformation wrought by the Enlightenment.91  It should come as 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 15.  
 87 Id. at 16. 
 88 Id. at 17; see also William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual 
Property Rights, Human Rights, and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European 
Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 135, 140 (1997) (arguing that “both 
explicit imperial policies about the dissemination of knowledge and broader social 
attitudes about the power of the past and the nature of creativity militated against the 
development of the notion of individual ownership of expressions of ideas” in imperial 
China).   
 89 Id. at 18.  
 90 Id. 
 91 See Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge: Are We Closer to the Answer(s)? The 
Potential Role of Geographical Indications, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 551, 554 (2009) 
(“The conflation of the Enlightenment’s focus on individual authorship, inventorship, and 
. . . Lockean tradition . . . on the one hand, and the belief that industrial progress through 
the protection . . . of innovation was essential, on the other hand, were the pillars on 
which modern intellectual property rules were built.”); Daniel Gervais, Traditional 
Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 137, 144–45 (2005) (“Intellectual property rights as means of rewarding individual 
effort are very much a child of the Enlightenment and 18th century European culture.”). 
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no surprise, then, that a concept such as intellectual property—so 
firmly rooted in the notion of securing individual rights from state 
incursion—failed to come about of its own accord in a society still 
governed by precisely the opposite impulses.92 
It is equally unsurprising that the impetus for the formal 
recognition of intellectual property rights in China came from 
abroad.  China’s initial forays into the realm of formal intellectual 
property protections amounted essentially to “meeting the demands 
or expectations of foreign powers with which China traded and 
from which China sought investment.”93  After China’s harrowing 
defeat at the hands of the British in the Opium War, which lasted 
from 1839 to 1842, Western commercial interests capitalized on 
the ensuing power vacuum to extract diplomatic concessions from 
the imperial Chinese government.94  Consequently, foreign 
investment in China increased over the course of the nineteenth 
century such that, by the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese 
entities began to make unauthorized use of foreign trademarks and 
trade names so as to benefit from their domestic popularity.95  
Protection of trademarks was, accordingly, the focus of treaties 
brokered just after the dawn of the twentieth century between 
China, on the one hand, and Britain, Japan, and the United States, 
on the other.96  Disputes between China and these foreign powers, 
however, resulted in the protections afforded by the treaties 
remaining unavailable until 1923, “and then more in name than 
fact.”97  The same results obtained for patent and copyright, 
leading Britain, the United States, and other foreign commercial 
powers operating in China to enact bilateral treaties as a means of 
protecting their intellectual property rights from Chinese 
 
 92 See Miller, supra note 1, at 107 (“In Chinese history it is difficult to discern the 
occurrence of any ideas along the lines of what came to be known in the West as 
inalienable individual personal rights, such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”).  
For a varying perspective, see Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About 
Copyright Policy, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131–43.   
 93 Natalie P. Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO over China’s Intellectual Property 
Regime, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 65, 66 (2012).  
 94 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 32. 
 95 Id. at 34. 
 96 Id. at 36–37. 
 97 Id. at 41. 
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infringement. 98  China did enact copyright, patent, and trademark 
legislation in 1910, 1912, and 1923, respectively, although these 
laws were largely ineffective at curbing piracy.99 
Imperial China itself ceased to exist in 1911 with the collapse 
of the Qing dynasty, and neither the following tumultuous two-
decade period nor the subsequent Guomindang government 
brought about the establishment of a viable intellectual property 
regime.100  The waning years of the Qing were fraught with 
corruption, popular resentment of the ruling dynasty, and “the 
corrosive effects of China’s semicolonial status.”101  Furthermore, 
the foreign treaty signatories whose collective commercial 
presence in China had resulted in the inauguration of intellectual 
property protections there failed to convey to the Chinese 
government how intellectual property protections could benefit 
China.102  The sociopolitical context in China following the 
collapse of the Qing, therefore, was hardly ripe for lasting legal 
reform.  After assuming power in 1928, the Guomindang 
government attempted to establish a lasting legal framework, 
including measures designed to protect intellectual property 
rights.103  Examples of such legislation include the Copyright Law 
of 1928,104 the Trademark Law of 1930,105 and the Measures to 
Encourage Industrial Arts of 1932.106  Professor Alford posits two 
reasons for the ultimate failure of the Guomindang’s efforts to 
establish a viable intellectual property regime: first, external forces 
plagued the government, including the Manchurian invasion of 
1931, the campaign to suppress the Communists, Japanese 
aggression, and the eventual Chinese civil war; second, the laws 
that were passed took for granted a legal structure and 
 
 98 Id. at 41–42. 
 99 See Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual 
Property Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 72 (2012). 
 100 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 48–55. 
 101 Id. at 48. 
 102 Id. at 49. 
 103 Id. at 50. 
 104 Id.; see also Frank Lin, Piracy in China: Identifying the Problem and Implementing 
Solutions, 14-WTR CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 83, 85 (2005). 
 105 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 51. 
 106 Id. at 52. 
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consciousness non-existent in early twentieth-century China.107  
Indeed, such laws were drafted on the false assumption that their 
audience possessed a certain degree of familiarity with foreign 
legal traditions; in reality, most Chinese were unfamiliar not only 
with the concept of intellectual property but also with “the very 
idea of vindicating rights through active involvement in a formal 
legal process meant to be adversarial in nature.”108 
The PRC came into existence on October 1, 1949, and initially 
adopted a Marxist-influenced Soviet model to guide the 
implementation of intellectual property law.109  Professor Natalie 
Stoianoff of the University of Technology, Sydney, posits that the 
intellectual property policy of the PRC can be divided into two 
stages: the Maoist era and the Open Door Policy era, with a “stark 
contrast in ideologies” distinguishing the two periods from each 
other.110  The Maoist era, roughly corresponding to the period 
spanning the founding of the PRC to the end of the Cultural 
Revolution,111 witnessed the synthesis of Confucian and 
Communist morality as a means of simultaneously “scorning 
commercial profit” and outwardly embracing the “development of 
science and technology.”112  As Professor Alford notes, such a 
fusion was possible because both Marxism and Confucianism 
perceived original creations as products not of their individual 
creators but of the societies to which their creators belonged.113  
Accordingly, neither philosophy articulates a compelling reason to 
invest original works with ownership interests.114  Pursuant to this 
governing philosophy, the PRC in 1963 issued the Regulations on 
Awards for Inventions, which provided that the state maintained 
ultimate ownership of inventions.115  Moreover, copyright 
 
 107 Id. at 53. 
 108 Id. at 54. 
 109 Id. at 56–57. 
 110 Stoianoff, supra note 93, at 68. 
 111 Id. at 69. 
 112 Id. at 68 (citing Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 15, 56–59 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 113 See ALFORD, supra note 18, at 57. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Stoianoff, supra note 93, at 68. 
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protections during the Maoist era were entirely eliminated.116  
Furthermore, the Regulations Governing the Control of 
Trademarks, promulgated in 1963, lacked any reference 
whatsoever to “rights” or “exclusive use.”117  Needless to say, little 
in the way of legal reforms resulted from the Cultural 
Revolution—a period perhaps best characterized by the maxim, “Is 
it necessary for a steel worker to put his name on a steel ingot that 
he produces in the course of his duty?  If not, why should a 
member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name 
on what he produces?”118 
In contrast to the Maoist era, the Open Door Policy era, which 
commenced after the Cultural Revolution,119 witnessed China’s 
adoption of “the [W]estern tradition of acknowledging individual 
exclusionary ownership rights over intellectual property and, 
indeed, other forms of property.”120  Professor Stoianoff asserts 
that legal developments in China have converged with those of 
Europe and that China has, since 1978, attempted in earnest to 
comply with international expectations.121  Indeed, China enacted 
formal trademark, patent, and copyright legislation—all of which 
is still in effect—in 1982,122 1984,123 and 1990,124 respectively.  
Additionally, China joined the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in 1980,125 and acceded to the Paris Convention in 
1984126 and to the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions in 
1992.127  Finally, China acceded to the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) in 1999,128 and, upon 
harmonizing its intellectual property legislation with TRIPS, joined 
 
 116 Id. at 69. 
 117 ALFORD, supra note 18, at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118 Id. at 65 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 119 Id.; see also Stoianoff, supra note 93, at 68–69. 
 120 Stoianoff, supra note 93, at 68. 
 121 Id. at 69. 
 122 See Campbell, supra note 99, at 75. 
 123 Id. at 85. 
 124 Id. at 102. 
 125 See Stoianoff, supra note 93, at 70. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 72. 
 128 Id.  
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the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001.129  Collectively, 
these legal developments, in accordance with Professor Stoianoff’s 
view, appear to indicate the willing embrace by China of precisely 
the sort of legal framework in which intellectual property 
protections exist in the West.  Professor Alford proffered a more 
guarded assessment in 1993, however, arguing that China’s 
attempt to “have it ‘both ways’” in simultaneously providing for 
intellectual property rights in legislation while failing to enforce 
such rights “has resulted in having it neither way.”130 
B. The Regime As It Currently Exists: Avenues of Enforcement 
Available to Right Holders 
1. Customs 
At present, China possesses an intellectual property regime that 
affords right holders several avenues of enforcement.  Beginning—
literally—at the periphery, the Chinese Customs Administration 
(“Customs”) has exclusive jurisdiction over the protection of 
intellectual property rights at China’s borders.131  Customs serves 
two primary functions: it prevents counterfeit goods produced in 
China from being exported and it prevents counterfeit goods 
produced abroad from entering China’s borders.132  Right holders 
can make use of Customs in two ways.  They can submit a request 
to Customs to detain a particular shipment of infringing goods, 
although Customs will not act unless the right holder provides the 
requisite documentation and pays an obligatory bond.133  
Alternatively, Customs officials may act ex officio to protect goods 
that have already been entered into its database; in such 
circumstances, Customs officials may contact the right holder and 
give him the option of filing a request for the goods to be 
 
 129 Id. at 72–73. 
 130 ALFORD, supra note 18, at 94. 
 131 See DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 72.  Dimitrov’s recent study provides an exceedingly 
thorough analysis of China’s entire intellectual property apparatus.  Furthermore, much 
of Dimitrov’s information was gleaned from personal interviews of anonymous Chinese 
government officials and, accordingly, is not readily available to the public in other 
sources.  For those reasons, Dimitrov’s study serves as the basis for this section.  
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 78. 
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detained.134  Writing in 2008, Dartmouth University professor 
Martin K. Dimitrov predicted that the quality of enforcement 
provided by Chinese Customs was on the upswing primarily as a 
result of its centralization in 1998, but that in and of itself such 
enforcement was insufficiently deterrent.135 
2. The Chinese Judiciary 
Right holders can also seek redress in Chinese courts.  China 
has a five-tiered court system: the Supreme People’s Court, thirty-
one provincial high people’s courts, 346 intermediate people’s 
courts, 3,135 county-level people’s courts, and 11,000 township- 
and town-level people’s tribunals together constitute the Chinese 
judicial hierarchy.136  While Professor Dimitrov highlights 
increasing litigation, a higher degree of legal professionalism, and 
greater judicial independence as three positive trends, he also 
points to several weaknesses plaguing China’s judiciary.137  First, 
he cites as “technical” obstacles to improvement the need for 
newer and clearer laws and regulations to be made immediately 
available to the public; reform in select areas of the law; more 
lawyers and judges, especially in rural areas; and incentives to 
diminish judicial corruption.138  Second, the Chinese Communist 
Party (“the Party”), in his estimation, hinders judicial 
independence by ensuring that judges “toe the party line on 
politically sensitive issues.”139  Finally, Professor Dimitrov 
maintains that the Party precludes the implementation of the rule of 
law by maintaining a parallel system of justice, the Discipline and 
Inspection Commission system, which “puts party members above 
the law.”140 
On a more positive note, however, China is perhaps the only 
country in the world to have established specialized intellectual 
 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. at 83–84. 
 136 Id. at 97–98.  These figures are accurate as of 2001. 
 137 Id. at 100–01. 
 138 Id. at 100.  
 139 Id. at 100–01. 
 140 Id. at 101. 
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property tribunals that hear civil cases in the first instance.141  Such 
specialized tribunals are located at ordinary courts but presided 
over by judges with specialized training.142  According to Professor 
Dimitrov, “rich localities with high levels of inventive activity 
have higher rates of litigation[,]” suggesting that areas such as 
Zhejiang, Tianjin, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Beijing—the five 
Chinese provinces with intellectual property tribunals that handled 
more than ten cases in 2004—may be better equipped to resolve 
complex lawsuits than courts in other parts of the country.143  As a 
consequence of the establishment of the specialized tribunals, 
parties in intellectual property cases enjoy what Professor Dimitrov 
deems “the highest quality of judicial review that is currently 
available in China.”144  In addition, most first-instance intellectual 
property cases involve open court hearings, which, coupled with 
published decisions by the tribunals, enhance the transparency of 
this sector of the Chinese judiciary.145  Finally, a relatively high 
rate of appeal of first-instance cases may demonstrate that the 
intellectual property tribunals are fairer and more trusted than other 
Chinese courts.146 
3. Administrative Enforcement of Patents 
At the core of China’s intellectual property regime is a 
complex, highly fragmented administrative bureaucracy with 
enforcement responsibilities.  At the outset, it is important to note 
that the various agencies comprising this bureaucracy play a far 
greater role in enforcing intellectual property rights in China than 
do other institutions; indeed, administrative enforcement cases 
outnumber other types of cases by a factor of one hundred.147  
 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 104–05. 
 144 Id. at 106. 
 145 Id. at 106–07. 
 146 Id. at 107.  See also Mark Cohen, Crossing the River by Feeling the IP Stones: How 
China’s Civil Procedure System Benefits from Reforms Made in IP Civil Litigation, 
CHINA IPR (Nov. 8, 2012), http://chinaipr.com (surveying China’s recently-passed 
revised Civil Procedure Law, which contains provisions that may enhance judicial 
transparency).  
 147 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 115. 
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While the State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”) was intended 
to serve as an intellectual property super-bureaucracy that would 
oversee discrete patent, copyright, and trademark sub-
bureaucracies, that has not come to pass.148  Instead, SIPO, which 
was modeled on the United States Patent and Trademark Office, is 
essentially indistinguishable from the China Patent Bureau—
officially, a sub-bureau within SIPO—and amounts to little more 
than China’s de facto patent agency.149 
China provides three types of patents: invention patents, which 
protect new products or processes and are awarded for twenty 
years; utility model patents, which protect simpler inventions, 
require only a formal examination for novelty, and are awarded for 
twenty years; and design patents, which protect unique shapes and 
forms, and are awarded for ten years.150  SIPO has three primary 
responsibilities: patent examination, reexamination, and 
invalidation; resolving patent infringement disputes; and providing 
enforcement in cases of patent counterfeiting and passing off.151  
The first two avenues of enforcement generally proceed in an 
efficient manner, a positive development that Professor Dimitrov 
attributes to SIPO’s sharing of enforcement jurisdiction in these 
two areas with the courts, which provide right holders with another 
means of patent protection and incentivize SIPO officials to 
resolve disputes satisfactorily in the first instance rather than risk 
being subjected to subsequent judicial review.152  The third avenue 
of enforcement does not share its jurisdiction with the courts; 
instead, local officials typically investigate patent counterfeiting 
and passing off themselves.  This results in what Professor 
Dimitrov describes as an unpredictable pattern of enforcement.153  
As Fordham University School of Law Visiting Professor Mark 
Cohen recounts, recent legislative trends may serve as cause for 
 
 148 See ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 108 (2005).  
 149 Id. at 111. 
 150 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 250. 
 151 Id. at 255. 
 152 Id. at 255–56. 
 153 Id. at 260. 
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concern about the future state of China’s patent enforcement.154  
Specifically, SIPO published for comment draft amendments to the 
Chinese Patent Law on August 10, 2012155 even though “the ink 
[was] hardly dry” on 2008 amendments to the same law.156  
Professor Cohen contends that this development arose out of the 
senior leadership’s frustration with the pace of innovation in China 
and the leadership’s desire to increase the potential for Chinese 
patents to generate revenue.157  The draft amendments contain a 
host of troubling proposals158 that bolster the enforcement 
responsibilities of the comparatively inefficient administrative 
bureaucracy at the expense of the courts,159 including the 
specialized intellectual property tribunals.160  Furthermore, the 
drafting process was notable not only for SIPO’s lack of 
consultation with foreign actors, but also for SIPO’s reliance on 
information regarding patent enforcement from Hangzhou and 
Wenzhou, jurisdictions where foreigners “have suffered major 
losses . . . under questionable circumstances,” and the 
corresponding failure of SIPO to seek similar information from 
Beijing, the locus of most foreign-related patent litigation.161  
Professor Cohen concludes that “the draft patent amendments 
could erode the [ten-plus] year understanding that China was 
 
 154 See Mark Cohen, Why the Proposed Amendments to the Patent Law Really Matter 
… And Maybe Not Just For Patents, CHINA IPR (Sept. 6, 2012), http://chinaipr.com. 
 155 Joint Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property 
Law and Section of International Law on the Draft Amendments to the People’s Republic 
of China Patent Law 1 (2012), available at 
http://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/aba-comments-on-china-patent-law-
revisions-finalcombo-7sep2012.pdf. 
 156 Cohen, supra note 154. 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 Id. (arguing that the amendments increase the authority of the administrative 
enforcement bureaucracy at the expense of the courts in two ways: “the LPO’s [Local 
Patent Offices] [can now] adjudicate civil patent disputes,” and “SIPO now proposes to 
give local patent offices added authority, thereby seeming to contradict the earlier goal of 
centralizing patent cases rather than a further devolution of authority to local LPO’s”).  
 160 Id. (contending that the draft amendments relegate China “to its state of IP affairs 
before WTO accession, when local IP offices . . . had the authority to award damages in 
administrative cases.  [Such] provisions were removed from China’s IP laws . . . in 
response to domestic pressure to protect property rights . . . through greater reliance on 
the civil courts”). 
 161 Id. 
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evolving to a system that would primarily protect IP as a private 
property right through relying upon an increasingly expert civil 
judicial system.”162 
4. Administrative Enforcement of Copyright 
According to Cornell University professor Andrew Mertha, 
China’s copyright enforcement bureaucracy is poorly managed163 
and has historically been ineffective due to insufficient personnel 
and funding in addition to its “embeddedness within another 
powerful bureaucracy that often pursued different priorities.”164  
Accordingly, the primary advocates of copyright protection in 
China are foreign right holders whose interests often conflict with 
those of powerful domestic groups, a tension that Professor 
Dimitrov deems responsible for the low quality of copyright 
enforcement.165  China’s copyright bureaucracy is multifaceted, 
with many agencies possessing national-level enforcement 
jurisdiction, including the National Press and Publications 
Administration, the National Copyright Administration (“NCA”), 
and the Ministry of Culture.166  Moreover, China’s copyright 
bureaucracy provides only one form of routine enforcement to 
right holders: “quasi-judicial enforcement,” which is conducted in-
house by the NCA and results in written punishment decisions.167 
Two trends characterize quasi-judicial enforcement of foreign 
copyrights: first, the volume of such enforcement is very low and 
rarely exceeds one percent of the NCA’s overall caseload; and 
second, there is a substantial degree of regional variation in the 
level of such enforcement, with richer, coastal provinces handling 
the overwhelming majority of cases.168  Relatively clear 
enforcement mandates as well as the NCA’s publication of some of 
its administrative decisions constitute two positive trends in 
 
 162 Id. 
 163 MERTHA, supra note 148, at 118. 
 164 Id. at 119. 
 165 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 222. 
 166 MERTHA, supra note 148, at 146–47.  On page 146 of his study, Mertha provides a 
useful flow chart of China’s copyright enforcement bureaucracy. 
 167 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 236. 
 168 Id. at 236–38. 
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copyright enforcement, yet the low rate of appeal of such decisions 
may demonstrate that the NCA discourages plaintiffs from making 
use of its appellate mechanisms.169  Amendments to Chinese 
copyright law are currently undergoing review, and while 
copyright protections are slated to be extended to the areas of 
applied art and sports broadcasting, it remains to be seen whether 
this legislation will improve administrative copyright 
enforcement.170 
5. Administrative Enforcement of Trademarks 
At least six different administrative agencies possess trademark 
enforcement mandates,171 including, at the national level, the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) and the State 
Quality Technical Supervision and Quarantine Bureau.172  While 
such an array of administrative enforcement options may appear to 
benefit victims of trademark infringement, this lack of 
centralization actually gives rise to two problems: multiple 
agencies working together may provide enforcement that is 
duplicative and uncoordinated, and an agency may “shirk” its 
enforcement responsibilities.173  Such shirking can take two forms.  
An agency may flatly refuse to take on a particular case, or it can 
“shirk strategically” by taking on a case on the condition that the 
right holder provide a case-handling fee, which essentially 
amounts to a bribe.174  Professor Dimitrov contends that shirking 
arises from the conflict of interest between the licensing and 
supervisory functions of a particular agency, a tension that 
“characterize[s] the work of every administrative agency with a 
trademark or copyright enforcement portfolio in China.”175  
Chinese bureaucracies grant many types of licenses to firms that 
they regulate, but pursuing a duly licensed firm that has engaged in 
 
 169 Id. at 241. 
 170 See Mark Cohen, Third Draft of the Copyright Law Amendments Undergoing 
Internal Review, CHINA IPR (Oct. 14, 2012), http://chinaipr.com. 
 171 See DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 185. 
 172 MERTHA, supra note 148, at 191.  On this page of his study, Mertha provides a 
highly useful flow chart of China’s trademark enforcement bureaucracy.  
 173 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 186. 
 174 Id.  
 175 Id. 
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counterfeiting could result in driving such a firm out of business, 
thereby harming a local community’s economy and depriving the 
agency of licensing fees.176  Accordingly, Professor Dimitrov 
posits that agencies are ultimately more sympathetic towards 
counterfeiters than to foreign right holders, because “right holders 
may be here today and gone tomorrow” while counterfeiting is a 
reliable, long-term source of income for many local economies.177  
Indeed, Professor Mertha reckoned that a single physical market 
for counterfeit goods—the “Kunming Xichang electronics and 
audiovisuals market”—generated nearly $900,000 in one year in 
licensing and other fees, a sum that amounts to roughly seventy 
times the yearly budget of a particular enforcement agency’s 
investigative team.178  In addition to duplicative enforcement and 
shirking, right holders are confronted with the problem that each 
enforcement agency treats a counterfeiting case differently, thereby 
enhancing the unpredictability of an enforcement environment that 
is already difficult to navigate.179  Finally, it bears mentioning that 
in 2005 the number of cases handled by the SAIC was greater by a 
multiple of nearly thirty than that handled by the courts, which, 
despite the relative costliness of litigation, may ultimately provide 
right holders with a more favorable outcome.180 
6. Criminal Enforcement of Infringement 
Finally, China provides for the criminal enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in three ways: right holders can initiate 
the private prosecution of an infringer, the police can accept a case 
transferred to them by an administrative agency, or the police can 
initiate a prosecution themselves.181  While nearly all such 
prosecutions lead to convictions, only one-tenth of one percent of 
the intellectual property cases handled by Chinese administrative 
bureaucracies in 2004 were criminal in nature.182  This result is 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 MERTHA, supra note 148, at 185–86. 
 179 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 188. 
 180 Id. at 189. 
 181 Id. at 146–47. 
 182 Id. at 146. 
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attributable to the labyrinthine process by which criminal 
prosecutions proceed: an administrative agency must decide to 
transfer a case to the police, who themselves must decide to 
transfer the case to the Procuratorate,183 which has the authority to 
arrest the infringer and introduce the case in court, where the case 
may or may not be accepted.184  Professor Dimitrov reasons that 
the volume of criminal enforcement is so low primarily because of 
unwillingness at each step of this procedural pipeline to move 
cases forward.185  Nevertheless, there is a high degree of regional 
variation in the volume of criminal enforcement of intellectual 
property rights; predictably, developed coastal cities take seriously 
their enforcement responsibilities, while criminal prosecutions 
occur less frequently in those communities where counterfeiting is 
the local government’s primary source of income.186  Conviction 
will almost certainly result, however, in the event that a case of 
infringement does it make it to court, a trend that may well reflect 
a result-oriented system designed to “generate convictions, not 
volume.”187 
C. Empirical Data on Foreign Intellectual Property Litigants in 
China 
Foreigners may have strong opinions about the effectiveness of 
China’s intellectual property regime,188 but relatively few of them 
actually make use of it.  Indeed, more intellectual property-related 
civil litigation occurs in China than in any other country in the 
world,189 yet the presence of foreign litigants there is quantitatively 
 
 183 See Gregory S. Kolton, Copyright Law and the People’s Courts in the People’s 
Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China’s Intellectual Property Courts, 17 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 415, 441 n.61 (1996) (describing the function of the Procuratorate); 
see also id. at 424–30.   
 184 DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 146. Dimitrov describes the Procuratorate as the law 
enforcement organ whose “chief responsibility [in intellectual property cases] is the 
criminal indictment of . . . suspects.” Id. at 158. 
 185 Id. at 148.  A recently promulgated opinion by the State Council, however, directly 
addresses this problem.  See infra, note 268.  
 186 See DIMITROV, supra note 8, at 157–58. 
 187 Id. at 159. 
 188 See infra Part II.B.  
 189 Hope Shimabuku & Mark Cohen, China’s Current Intellectual Property Plan, 
Policies & Practices, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 17, 31 (2011). 
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negligible.  In 2009, for instance, Chinese courts adjudicated 
30,509 first-instance civil intellectual property cases, of which 
1,361—or roughly 4.5%—involved foreign litigants.190  In 2010, 
Chinese courts decided 41,718 such cases, 1369 of which involved 
foreign litigants, a figure amounting to roughly 3.2%.191  In 2011, 
this figure had dropped to 1,321, a mere 2.3% of the 58,201 total 
first-instance civil intellectual property cases that Chinese courts 
decided that year.192  As these figures demonstrate, foreigners 
“would not even account for a rounding error in Chinese civil IPR 
litigation.”193  Moreover, even though the absolute number of civil 
intellectual property cases entertained by Chinese courts has grown 
substantially in each of the last three years, the proportion of 
foreign litigants involved in such cases has remained stagnant. 
Viewing intellectual property litigation within the context of 
civil litigation in general reveals just how few foreigners occupy a 
position on the Chinese civil docket.  In 2011, Chinese courts 
entertained a staggering 7,169,083 civil cases, yet only 36,230—or 
0.5%—of these cases involved foreign litigants.194  In addition, 
intellectual property cases in toto comprised less than one percent 
of China’s civil docket in 2011.195  As mentioned earlier,196 
Chinese courts heard around 58,000 civil intellectual property 
cases in 2011, roughly 1,300 of which—or 2.3%—involved 
foreign litigants.197  These data lead to two notable findings.  First, 
foreign litigants who sought to vindicate their intellectual property 
rights in China collectively amounted to less than 0.02% of the 
2011 Chinese civil docket, an infinitesimal proportion.198  Second, 
 
 190 Sup. People’s Ct., People’s Republic of China, WHITE PAPER OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION BY CHINESE COURTS IN 2009 42 (2010). 
 191 Sup. People’s Ct., People’s Republic of China, WHITE PAPER OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION BY CHINESE COURTS IN 2010 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.cpahkltd.com/UploadFiles/20110509082512655.pdf.  
 192 Sup. People’s Ct., People’s Republic of China, WHITE PAPER OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION BY CHINESE COURTS IN 2011 31 (2012). 
 193 Shimabuku and Cohen, supra note 189, at 32. 
 194 Mark Cohen, Foreign IP Litigation in China: How Important Is It?, CHINA IPR 
(Oct. 18, 2012), http://chinaipr.com. 
 195 See infra note 245.   
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See Cohen, supra note 194. 
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of the roughly 36,000 civil cases involving foreigners that Chinese 
courts heard in 2011, only around 1,300—or roughly 3.6%—
involved intellectual property rights.199  What rights, then, were the 
other roughly 34,000 foreign litigants seeking to enforce in 
Chinese civil courts?  As Cohen relates, foreigners in 2011 were 
involved in 8,286 maritime cases, 4,727 contract cases, 4,450 
ownership cases, and 1,727 cases involving the recognition or 
execution of foreign court judgments.200  In sum, foreigners make 
scant use of Chinese courts in general, and comparatively fewer 
foreigners make use of Chinese courts to vindicate their 
intellectual property rights. 
II. THE PARADOX OF ENFORCEMENT: CONTRADICTORY 
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 
A. The Apologists’ Perspective 
Some commentators have expressed the view that China’s 
intellectual property regime is—or soon will be—capable of 
providing for the efficient resolution of disputes arising out of 
infringement.  In a recent article, Drake University professor Peter 
Yu relates that neither the United States government nor American 
holders of intellectual property rights are satisfied with China’s 
intellectual property regime.201  Nevertheless, Professor Yu is 
optimistic about the imminent future of intellectual property 
enforcement in China.  In particular, he claims not only that 
China’s regime has improved,202 but also that China sits poised to 
cross over from the “less promising” to the “more promising” side 
of what he deems the “intellectual property divide.”203  Somewhat 
forebodingly, he cautions that the United States may be in for a 
“rude awakening” should the strengthening of its intellectual 
 
 199 See id.; infra note 245. 
 200 Cohen, supra note 194. 
 201 Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 525, 529 (2012). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 532.  
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property regime render China “an intellectual property power 
against which the United States may not be interested in 
competing.”204  Specifically, Professor Yu predicts that the rule of 
law will take hold in China to a deeper extent than at present, and 
that China’s legal system will accordingly meet with substantially 
more use.205  Consequently, “litigation-related disruption”206 to the 
business activities of foreigners will render it “very costly for 
foreign rights holders or new local firms to enter the market.”207  
Moreover, Professor Yu posits that China will become increasingly 
innovative as a result of improvements to its intellectual property 
regime and, consequently, that the United States will lose the 
competitive advantage that it has “traditionally enjoyed as a result 
of its much higher intellectual property standards.”208  Overall, 
Professor Yu presents a vision of China’s intellectual property 
regime as on the verge of becoming so robust that it may even 
adversely affect the interests of foreign right holders by leaving 
them afloat in a sea of costly litigation.  Notwithstanding the 
ambivalence of this prediction, Professor Yu’s article implies that 
China soon will be a place where the holders of intellectual 
property rights can expect them to be enforced.209 
Southern Methodist University professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen 
adopts an even less guarded, more laudatory stance than Professor 
Yu regarding the current state of intellectual property protections 
and enforcement in China.210  Professor Nguyen seeks to present 
“a startling new picture of China that directly contradicts the 
dominant negative view of China’s approach to intellectual 
property rights.”211  Ultimately, she argues that China is “very 
protective” of intellectual property rights, a conclusion that she 
grounds primarily in the recent surge in intellectual property 
 
 204 Id. at 543. 
 205 Id. at 546. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 547. 
 208 Id. at 550–51. 
 209 See id. at 580 (“The oft-repeated story about China as a major pirating nation is too 
simple and too outdated.”).  
 210 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s 
Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773 (2011). 
 211 Id. at 773. 
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litigation in China, which has overwhelmingly involved 
exclusively Chinese parties.212  Specifically, Professor Nguyen 
contends that the willingness of the Chinese to employ judicial 
remedies to resolve intellectual property disputes demonstrates that 
“Chinese businesses and individuals have learned in a very short 
time to recognize and embrace the fruit of their intellectual 
endeavors.”213  In addition to acknowledging the newfound desire 
on the part of Chinese right holders to seek redress in court, 
Professor Nguyen marshals select cases to support her claim that 
the Chinese judiciary itself recognizes both the existence of 
intellectual property rights as well as when infringement of those 
rights results in loss to right holders.214  Professor Nguyen also 
expresses bewilderment at the dearth of foreign litigants, a trend 
that she characterizes as “contradictory to the persistent outcry 
against Chinese piracy and the abuse of intellectual property rights 
belonging to foreign owners.”215  Accordingly, she submits that the 
glaring dearth of foreign litigants is perhaps attributable to the 
long-standing perception of China as a place hostile to intellectual 
property rights.216 
The favorable views of China’s intellectual property regime 
presented above are, perhaps unsurprisingly, shared by those who 
oversee that regime.  In particular, Tian Lipu, the commissioner of 
SIPO,217 recently lambasted what he deemed the distortion of 
China’s intellectual property regime by Western media.218  Tian 
 
 212 Id. at 774–75. 
 213 Id. at 797–98. 
 214 Id. at 801. 
 215 Id. at 810. 
 216 Id.  
 217 Tian Lipu, Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office, 
http://english.gov.cn/2006-02/10/content_185207.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).   
 218 See Ben Blanchard, China Slams “Distorted” View of Copyright Piracy Problem, 
REUTERS, Nov., 11, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/11/us-
china-congress-piracy-idUSBRE8AA04620121111; see also Tian Lipu, China Is Serious 
About Intellectual Property, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748703727804576017992675772926.html (conceding that “intellectual-
property infringement is still relatively serious in some regions and with some 
products[,]” but contending that “[c]omplaints about China’s protection of intellectual 
property are often exaggerated” and that “intellectual-property enforcement [i]s no longer 
the problem of the U.S., nor . . . a problem of China—it [i]s now a global problem”).  
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acknowledged the existence of intellectual property infringement 
as a legitimate problem that continues to plague China.219  
Nevertheless, Tian decried the failure of Western media to 
recognize important facts about China’s intellectual property 
regime.220  Specifically, Tian highlighted China’s status as “the 
world’s largest payer for [i.e., buyer of] patent rights . . . trademark 
rights . . . royalties, [and as] one of the largest [buyers of] . . . real 
software.”221  He emphasized that the software used by China’s 
government officials, banks, insurance companies, and businesses 
is not pirated.222  Furthermore, Tian contended that if foreign 
companies such as Apple, Inc., were so fearful that their 
intellectual property rights would be infringed in China, then such 
companies would not have chosen China as their preferred base of 
production.223  Referring to Apple in particular, Tian remarked that 
most of its products are made in China, whereupon those products 
are exported to foreign markets where their value increases.224  
Tian concluded that companies such as Apple choose to take 
advantage of China’s comparatively favorable manufacturing 
environment precisely because those companies trust China’s 
intellectual property regime to protect their rights.225 
B. The Critics’ Perspective 
Despite the positive portrayal of China’s intellectual property 
regime by some, the general perception in the United States is that 
it leaves much to be desired.  Indeed, “[f]or all their sparring,” 
wrote Richard D’Aveni in the pages of The Washington Post on 
the eve of the 2012 United States Presidential election, “President 
Obama and [challenger] Mitt Romney agree on this: China lurks as 
 
 219 Blanchard, supra note 218. (“‘Speaking honestly, there is a market. People use and 
buy pirated goods,’ Tian told reporters on the sidelines of a landmark Communist Party 
congress.”).  
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. (“‘This could only happen because China’s intellectual property rights 
environment sets foreign investors at ease allowing them to come to China to 
manufacture.’”). 
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a threat to U.S. businesses.”226  As D’Aveni pointed out, the 
United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) named China, for 
the eighth year, to its priority watch list in 2012.227  The USTR 
disseminates such determinations in its annual Special 301 Report, 
a review of the worldwide state of intellectual property rights 
protection and enforcement.228  While the 2012 Special 301 Report 
commends China for its establishment of a State Council-level 
leadership structure to oversee enforcement,229 recognizes the 
Chinese leadership’s commitment to enhancing political 
accountability,230 and speaks positively of China’s promulgation of 
a draft Judicial Interpretation intended to clarify legal standards 
pertaining to inducement of infringement,231 the condemnatory far 
outweighs the laudatory in the report’s overall assessment.  
Preliminarily, the report not only notes that a “wide spectrum” of 
American right holders report serious obstacles to enforcement “of 
all forms of IPR in China,” but also expresses concern at the 
troubling direction that China’s intellectual property policies have 
taken recently.232 
The report lists three policies in particular that, in the view of 
the USTR, compound existing obstacles to satisfactory 
enforcement.233  First, the report decries “China’s efforts to link 
eligibility for government preferences to the national origin” of the 
intellectual property rights in a particular product.234  Second, the 
report notes that Chinese government agencies “are inappropriately 
using market access and investment approvals as a means to 
compel foreign firms to license or sell their IPR to domestic 
 
 226 Richard D’Aveni, How U.S. Business Can Win Against China, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 
2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-us-business-can-win-against-
china/2012/10/12/7d773e80-0f3b-11e2-bd1a-b868e65d57eb_story.html. 
 227 Id. 
 228 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 4 (2012), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20 
Report_0.pdf.  
 229 Id. at 9.  
 230 Id.  
 231 Id. at 27.  
 232 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
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Chinese entities.”235  Third, the report expresses concern that sales 
of “IP-intensive goods and services remain disproportionately low 
when compared to sales in similar markets that provide stronger 
enforcements for IPR protection . . . .”236  In addition, the report 
laments a host of trends that contributes to what it deems a 
generally lackluster enforcement environment: trademark 
counterfeiting, copyright piracy, physical and online marketplaces 
for counterfeit goods, the manufacture of counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals, the lack of means to protect pharmaceutical test 
data from unfair use, and the export of counterfeit goods.237 
The report also refers to an “alarming increase” in cases 
involving trade secret theft, as well as the failure by China to 
impose sufficient deterrent penalties on infringers.238  Finally, the 
report highlights the concern of knowledge-based industries that 
certain indigenous innovation policies that the Chinese government 
pursues serve to “coerce the transfer of IPR from foreign rights 
holders to domestic entities.”239  In the estimation of the USTR, 
China is home to one of the bleakest enforcement environments of 
any country in the world. 
The private sector in the United States holds a similarly 
dispirited view of China’s intellectual property regime.  The 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (“IIPA”), a private 
sector coalition of trade associations representing American 
copyright-based industries, submits an annual report to the USTR 
and to other United States government agencies in advance of the 
USTR’s publication of its Special 301 Report.240  In its 2012 
report, the IIPA notes the persistence of high levels of copyright 
piracy in China, which ranges from the piracy of music, films, 
television shows, books and journals to the use and pre-installation 
on electronic devices of unlicensed software and “physical 
 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 27. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Description of the IIPA, INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, http://www.iipa.com/ 
aboutiipa.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).  
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piracy.”241  In addition, the report asserts that the continued 
existence of barriers to creative content, some of which violate 
China’s international WTO obligations, has resulted in the Chinese 
market for American copyright-based companies remaining largely 
closed.242  The report also contends that China’s legal institutions 
are insufficiently protective of intellectual property rights.  
Specifically, the report claims that thresholds for criminal liability 
are simply “too high to criminalize all piracy on a commercial 
scale as required by the TRIPS Agreement,” and further notes that 
such thresholds are not consistently followed by Chinese 
authorities.243  Moreover, the report criticizes procedural hurdles 
such as, inter alia, notarization requirements for documents that 
discriminate between Chinese and foreign right holders.244 
The results of two surveys released in 2012 further reveal the 
extent to which foreigners who conduct business in China harbor 
negative opinions of China’s intellectual property regime.  The 
first survey was conducted by the American Chamber of 
Commerce in the People’s Republic of China (“AmCham”), a non-
profit organization that represents American companies doing 
business in China, the membership of which comprises more than 
3,500 individuals from over 1,000 companies.245  According to the 
AmCham survey, sixty-six percent of 152 respondents felt that 
China’s enforcement of intellectual property rights either remained 
at the same level or deteriorated over the course of 2011, a figure 
that is especially striking in light of the Chinese government’s 
nine-month-long special campaign that year intended to combat 
infringement.246  Furthermore, only eight percent of 154 
respondents who had initiated an administrative action in response 
 
 241 INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ALLIANCE 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 29 
(2012), available at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2012/2012SPEC301CHINA.PDF.  
 242 See id. 
 243 Id. at 42. 
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 245 Welcome to AmCham China, AMCHAM CHINA, http://www.amchamchina.org/ 
article/10 (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
 246 AM. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, 2012 CHINA BUSINESS CLIMATE SURVEY 
REPORT 19 (2012), available at http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/cmsfile/ 
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to the infringement of their intellectual property rights were “very 
satisfied” with the level of cooperation from the relevant Chinese 
officials; in contrast, fifty-three percent were “somewhat satisfied” 
while the remaining thirty-nine percent were either “somewhat 
dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.”247  The opinions of the 131 
respondents who litigated infringement of their intellectual 
property rights were slightly better, with nine percent claiming to 
have been “very satisfied” with the level of cooperation from the 
requisite Chinese officials, while fifty-four percent were 
“somewhat satisfied” and thirty-eight percent either “somewhat 
dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied.”248 
In addition to the AmCham survey, the US-China Business 
Council (“UCBC”), a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization 
of roughly 240 American companies that do business in China,249 
conducted the China Business Environment Business Survey, 
which revealed opinions similar to those elicited by AmCham’s 
survey.250  Ninety-five percent of the UCBC’s respondents were 
either “somewhat concerned” or “very concerned” about China’s 
level of intellectual property enforcement, while nearly half of the 
respondents felt that such enforcement had either “remained 
unchanged,” “somewhat deteriorated,” or “greatly deteriorated” 
over the course of the previous year.251  Tellingly, seventy-two 
percent of respondents claimed that the level of intellectual 
property enforcement in China affected their business activities 
undertaken there.252  In particular, such enforcement—more 
precisely, the lack thereof—affected these respondents in the 
following ways: forty percent claimed that they limited the number 
of products they co-manufacture or license in China; another forty 
percent claimed that they curbed their research and development 
activities in China; thirty-six percent claimed that they limited the 
 
 247 Id. at 21.  
 248 Id.  
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number of products they manufacture in China; and twenty-two 
percent claimed that they limited the volume of products they sell 
in China.253  In sum, critics in the United States government and 
private sector present a vision of China’s intellectual property 
regime that contrasts starkly to the apologists’ generally positive 
portrayal. 
III. THESIS, ANTITHESIS, AND SYNTHESIS: DRAWING CONCLUSIONS 
ABOUT CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
A. Vindication for the Critics: The Apologist Characterization of 
China’s Intellectual Property Regime Is Misleading 
As any survey of the history of intellectual property in China 
would reveal, China’s modern enforcement regime is remarkable 
above all else for how quickly it has come into being.254  To its 
credit, China continues to take certain efforts to improve that 
regime.  In its Promotion Plan for the Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2012, SIPO reaffirms its 
commitment to bolstering enforcement, including bringing about a 
culture wherein “knowledge is respected, innovation is advocated, 
credibility is kept[,] and law is observed[.]”255  Moreover, recently 
enacted legislation includes revisions to draft versions of 
amendments to China’s copyright law256 and revised civil 
procedure law, which makes additional remedies available to 
litigants in intellectual property cases.257  While these 
developments may appear to vindicate the views of apologists for 
China’s intellectual property regime, other findings demonstrate 
that such a view is ultimately misguided.  In particular, the highly 
fragmented nature of China’s administrative intellectual property 
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bureaucracy,258 which plays a far more significant role in 
enforcement than the judiciary,259 militates against a generally 
positive characterization of China’s enforcement regime.  SIPO’s 
recently published draft amendments to China’s patent law provide 
for the transfer of enforcement jurisdiction from the judiciary to 
the administrative bureaucracy,260 a change that will serve only to 
retard the efficiency of patent enforcement.  Moreover, the quasi-
judicial enforcement of copyright infringement—the only means of 
administrative enforcement routinely available to copyright 
holders261—occurs at a negligibly low rate and almost entirely in 
the relatively rich, coastal provinces,262 the economies of which do 
not depend upon infringement.263  Such enforcement, therefore, 
can hardly be characterized as an avenue that foreign victims of 
copyright infringement should expect to work in their favor.  
Furthermore, the conflict of interest between the licensing and 
enforcement functions of agencies charged with redressing 
trademark infringement, and the attendant phenomenon of 
“shirking,”264 is a particularly bleak aspect of China’s intellectual 
property regime that appears likely to recede only when 
counterfeiting ceases to be a lucrative endeavor. 
China’s administrative enforcement bureaucracy is not the only 
flawed sector of its intellectual property regime.  Notwithstanding 
the relative efficiency of the specialized intellectual property 
tribunals,265 the Chinese judiciary suffers from a host of problems 
of its own.  Courts in rural areas are understaffed, judicial 
corruption persists, and the overbearing influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party serves to hinder the independence of judges.266  
Moreover, criminal prosecutions of infringers are hampered by 
bureaucratic inefficiencies,267 and while a recently promulgated 
 
 258 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
 259 See discussion supra note 147. 
 260 See discussion supra note 154. 
 261 See discussion supra note 167. 
 262 See discussion supra note 168. 
 263 See discussion supra note 186. 
 264 See discussion supra notes 173–75. 
 265 See discussion supra notes 144–47. 
 266 See discussion supra notes 139–40. 
 267 See discussion supra notes 182–85. 
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opinion of the State Council on enhancing the coordination of 
administrative and criminal enforcement is a promising 
development, it remains to be seen whether the opinion’s 
recommendations will be implemented.268  Overall, China’s 
intellectual property regime continues to suffer from too many 
problems to sustain the viewpoints of its apologists. 
B. The Long Shadow of the Past: Historical Phenomena Account 
for Shortcomings Plaguing China’s Intellectual Property 
Regime 
Shortcomings plaguing China’s intellectual property regime 
may be attributable to certain historical forces present in imperial 
China that continue to influence the country today.  Imperial China 
was a notably inventive society,269 yet the concept of an 
enforceable ownership interest in one’s original creation is a 
distinctively Western phenomenon.270  It is unsurprising, however, 
that intellectual property as a legal doctrine failed to emerge of its 
own accord in imperial China.  The Confucian ethos that 
underpinned imperial Chinese civilization emphasized deference to 
state and society at the expense of the exaltation and formal 
recognition of individual desires.271  Moreover, Buddhism and 
Confucianism gave rise to a literary and educational culture at odds 
with the notion of affording a particular individual a limited 
monopoly in his original creation.272 
These historical phenomena manifest themselves today in the 
manner by which the Chinese government has undertaken to 
 
 268 See Mark Cohen, New State Council Opinion on Improving Administrative/Criminal 
IPR Enforcement Coordination, CHINA IPR (Oct. 12, 2012) http://chinaipr.com 
/2012/10/12/new-state-council-opinion-on-improving-administrativecriminal-ipr-
enforcement-coordination.  According to a conversation that the author had with 
Professor Cohen, the State Council Opinion itself remains to be seen; rather, all that has 
been made available to the public are isolated descriptions of its provisions in the press, 
and, as of December 2012, the Opinion is still considered to be a “state secret.” 
Conversation with Professor Mark Cohen, Fordham University School of Law, in New 
York, New York (Dec. 3, 2012).  
 269 See discussion supra Introduction. 
 270 See discussion supra note 91.  
 271 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.  
 272 See id. 
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administer China’s intellectual property regime.  Ultimately, the 
Chinese state has acted primarily to preserve its own interests 
regardless of whether the state’s interests coincide with those of 
individual right holders, an approach that mirrors the Confucian 
emphasis of state over individual prerogatives.273  The 
circumstances surrounding the publication of draft amendments to 
China’s patent law buttress this view,274 as do aspects of the 
recently promulgated revised trademark law, which Professor 
Cohen deems to be only the latest among a “crop of revised IP 
laws in China . . . [that] are primarily being drafted to 
accommodate and anticipate China’s own needs, and not in 
response to international pressure.”275  Furthermore, trends in trade 
secret litigation buttress the conception of the Chinese state as 
preoccupied with advancing its own interests, perhaps even at right 
holders’ expense.276  Trade secret litigation is less likely to succeed 
than any other form in intellectual property litigation in China, a 
trend Professor Cohen suggests may be attributable to “industrial 
policy motivations for trade secret theft” that emphasize “acquiring 
information to satisfy national or local industrial plans or targets, 
particularly for state owned or state subsidized companies.”277  
Administrative and criminal enforcement trends also lend credence 
to this conception of the Chinese state’s motivations.  Agency 
shirking of enforcement mandates278 and a relatively low volume 
of criminal prosecutions of infringers279 are associated with local 
economies dependent on infringement, suggesting that organs of 
the state carry out their enforcement responsibilities in a manner 
designed advance the government’s interest in generating revenue 
at the expense of right holders’ interest in stamping out 
 
 273 See id. 
 274 See discussion supra, notes 154–62. 
 275 Mark Cohen, The Brave New World of Chinese IP Litigation—Trademarks, CHINA 
IPR (Nov. 13, 2012), http://chinaipr.com/2012/11/13/the-brave-new-world-of-chinese-ip-
legislation-trademarks/. 
 276 See Mark Cohen, What the Data Says About Trade Secret Litigation in China, 
CHINA IPR (Oct. 31, 2012), http://chinaipr.com/2012/10/31/what-the-data-says-about-
trade-secret-litigation-in-china/. 
 277 Id. 
 278 See discussion supra note 177. 
 279 See discussion supra note 186. 
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infringement.  That the overwhelming majority of quasi-judicial 
administrative copyright enforcement occurs in rich, coastal 
provinces adds additional weight to this view.280  In sum, historical 
trends present during the imperial period of China’s history 
continue to impact the Chinese state’s approach to administering 
its intellectual property regime and account for some of that 
regime’s significant shortcomings. 
C. What Can Be Done: How Foreign Right Holders Can Attempt 
to Improve Their Position Within China’s Intellectual Property 
Regime 
Despite its manifold shortcomings, there are aspects of China’s 
intellectual property regime that have proven to be relatively 
effective.  The specialized intellectual property tribunals constitute 
the regime’s brightest spot,281 and it is unfortunate that the Chinese 
government appears inclined to rob the judiciary of authority while 
bolstering that of the administrative bureaucracy, at least in the 
realm of patent enforcement.282  In light of this apparent trend, it is 
all the more unfortunate that the level of foreign litigation in China 
is so anemic and that the proportion of foreign litigants on China’s 
civil docket has shrunk over the past few years.283  Rather than shy 
away from vindicating their rights in court, foreign right holders 
should seek to make greater use of China’s judiciary, especially its 
specialized intellectual property tribunals.  That SIPO failed to 
consult any foreigners in the composition of its draft amendments 
to patent law reveals that the Chinese state is not inclined to seek 
out foreign viewpoints as to how best to improve its enforcement 
regime,284 a conclusion that is bolstered by the history of 
intellectual property protections in China.285 
As a counterweight to this lack of engagement by Chinese 
officials, foreign right holders should make greater use of the 
Chinese judiciary as a means of enforcing their rights and calling 
 
 280 See discussion supra note 168. 
 281 See discussion supra notes 144–47. 
 282 See discussion supra notes 154–62.  
 283 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 284 See discussion supra notes 154–62.    
 285 See discussion supra Part I.A.1; I.A.2.  
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attention to infringement.  Indeed, as Professor Dimitrov contends, 
those foreigners who do make use of China’s intellectual property 
tribunals are afforded the highest quality of judicial review that the 
country has to offer,286 and the remainder of the judiciary is not 
entirely devoid of positive attributes.287  In addition to making 
greater use of civil litigation, foreign right holders might attempt to 
vindicate their rights through initiating private criminal 
prosecutions of infringers, especially in the developed coastal 
cities where such enforcement is taken relatively seriously.288  
Even though the criminal prosecution process is highly 
cumbersome, recent reforms appear to be geared towards making it 
more efficient,289 and cases that ultimately do reach trial almost 
always result in convictions.290 
CONCLUSION 
While imperial China was a notably inventive place, formal 
intellectual property protections analogous to those in the West 
failed to emerge there of their own accord.  The deep influence of 
Confucianism on imperial Chinese society brought about a culture 
that subordinated individual desires to group harmony and 
perceived original creations as products not of individual people 
but of the society to which they belonged.  Moreover, 
Confucianism’s influence on education and literature rendered 
verbatim copying not merely an accepted practice but a 
fundamental aspect of scholarship.  Buddhism’s close connection 
to the emergence of printing in China also served to delay by 
centuries the first claims by authors of ownership interests in their 
works.  Accordingly, the impetus for China’s modern intellectual 
property regime came from abroad.  After China’s defeat in the 
Opium War, foreign investment in China increased dramatically 
and Western commercial interests began to press China for the 
legal recognition of their intellectual property rights.  An effective 
 
 286 See discussion supra note 144. 
 287 See discussion supra note 137. 
 288 See discussion supra note 186. 
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enforcement regime, however, eluded China until the birth of the 
PRC.  Since the late 1970s, the PRC has taken efforts to integrate 
China’s intellectual property regime with international institutions.  
China acceded to TRIPS in 1999 and joined the WTO in 2001.  In 
tandem with these legal developments, China’s economy has 
rapidly become the world’s second largest, a fact attributable 
largely to foreign direct investment. 
China’s economic rise especially affects foreign holders of 
intellectual property rights.  Commentators, however, differ starkly 
in their assessments of the ability of China’s intellectual property 
institutions to combat infringement.  On the one hand, China’s 
apologists claim that such institutions are—or imminently will 
be—sufficient to provide for the just and efficient resolution of 
disputes arising out of infringement.  On the other hand, China’s 
critics, particularly those in the United States, contend that China’s 
intellectual property regime fails to deter and remedy infringement.  
Ultimately, the views of China’s apologists are misleading.  
China’s specialized intellectual property tribunals have proven to 
be relatively effective, but insufficient resources, judicial 
corruption, and the inability of judges to act independent of the 
Chinese Communist Party hinder the effectiveness of China’s 
judiciary.  China’s fragmented administrative enforcement 
bureaucracy, which handles the overwhelming majority of disputes 
arising out of infringement, suffers from a host of problems that 
work to the detriment of right holders.  Criminal enforcement 
almost always results in convictions, yet procedural inefficiencies 
render such convictions frustratingly difficult to achieve.  These 
shortcomings may be attributed to certain historical phenomena.  
Specifically, the Chinese state, in administering China’s 
intellectual property regime, has adopted an approach that 
comports with Confucianism’s elevation of state prerogatives at 
the expense of individual interests.  Trends in patent law reform, 
trade secret litigation, and trademark enforcement bolster this 
conception of the Chinese state’s motivations. 
Foreign right holders, therefore, cannot reasonably expect 
China’s intellectual property regime to serve their interest in 
combating infringement.  Consequently, foreign victims of 
infringement should seek to reverse the trend of anemic foreign 
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litigation in China and employ China’s courts, especially the 
intellectual property tribunals, to vindicate their rights.  Indeed, the 
Chinese government appears disinclined to take foreign 
perspectives under consideration in drafting new intellectual 
property legislation, a trend that may render the courts the only 
venue where foreign right holders can air their grievances.  Finally, 
foreign right holders might also attempt to initiate private criminal 
prosecutions against infringers, although this avenue of 
enforcement is less likely to deliver favorable results. 
